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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1958
Release Through Fraud
In Shallenberger v. Motorists Mutual Ins. Co.,19 plaintiff claimed to
have been injured through the negligence of one Hartman. She also
claimed that she had been fraudulently induced by Hartman's insurance
company to give a release for her damages. Accordingly, her prayer was
for damages for the loss of her claim. The court held that she had mis-
conceived her remedy. She should have sought recission of the release
in equity so that she might then sue Hartman for her original cause of
action. At first sight the decision smacks of the days of the forms of
action, particularly since a number of courts seemed to have reached a
contra result, but the court has avoided the trial of a complicated case
involving the determination of issues of fraud as well as personal injuries.
The dates of the injuries and the supreme court decision indicate that
there was still time for the plaintiff to pursue her remaining remedies.
Cracks in Sidewalks
The supreme court still finds it necessary to exercise a firm hand in
the "cracks in the sidewalks" cases20 Once more, the current reactions of
a trial judge, a jury, and three appellate judges to the condition of certain
"city sidewalks" runs counter to the living law of the higher court. Those
who are interested in vital statistics will find the pertinent measurements
of the relevant crack in O'Brien v. City of Toledo.21
WALTER PROBERT
TRADE REGULATION
Use of Similar Names
Two Ohio court of appeals decisions dealt with the prohibition of the
use of similar names 'by competitors engaged in: similar business activities.
Friedman Transfer and Construction Co., Inc. v. Arrel Friedman1 in-
volved an action by a corporation to enjoin its competitor from operating
a similar type of business under the name of Arrel Friedman Transfer
and Storage. The plaintiff had operated its business under its corporate
name within the city of Youngstown for approximately 32 years. The
19. 167 Ohio St. 494, 150 N.E.2d 295 (1958).
20. For reference to the recent history of this problem, see 1955 Survey, 7 WEST.
REs. L REv. 340 (1956).
21. 167 Oio St. 35, 146 N.E.2d 122 (1958).
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defendant using the name of "Arrel Friedman Transfer and Storage' had
operated a business in the same area for several years, but without the
use of -the name "Friedman" until shortly before the filing of this action.
There was evidence of confusion arising from the similarity of names
and also that the name "Friedman" had become identified with plaintiffs
business of storage, transfer, hauling, cartage, and construction. The
court of appeals determined that the personal surname had acquired a
"secondary meaning," that the use of defendant's name might have created
deception and confusion, and affirmed the decision of the lower court,
enjoining the defendant from the use of his name in conjunction with the
words "transfer," "hauling," "cartage," or "construction." This holding
is in accord with much American and English authority for enjoining
the use by a rival of a personal surname which has already become so
identified with a particular business as to become synonymous with it.2
The other decision3 dealt with an action to enjoin a rival corporation's
use of -its authorized fanciful, non-descriptive corporate name in con-
junction with aluminum products in a situation wherein the plaintiff's
corporate name had acquired a secondary meaning when used in conjunc-
tion with the word "aluminum." Empire State Aluminum Corporation,
incorporated -in New York in 1951 and engaged in processing and dis-
tributing aluminum products throughout the United States under the
designation of "Empire Aluminum," sought to enjoin the Empire Alu-
minum Co., an Ohio corporation since 1956 from advertising its name
and products nationally and locally to the confusion of the buying public.
There was evidence that plaintiff had established the name "Empire," a
part of its corporate name, in combination with the word "aluminum"
in the industry in such a manner as to associate the two words whenever
used as referring to the plaintiff's firm. The court of appeals affirmed
the decision of the court of common pleas by granting a permanent in-
junction restraining the defendant from directly or indirectly using or
referring to -the name "Empire Aluminum" alone, op. in combination with
other words, in connection with the advertising or operation of the
business of manufacturing, fabricating, processing, purchasing, selling, or
distributing aluminum or products incorporating aluminum therein. The
court of appeals relied heavily upon earlier Ohio authority which pro-
tected prior users of a trade name or description name from the confusion
1. 146 N.E.2d 886 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956). See also CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
section, supra.
2. See 1 NiMs, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS, § 72 at 261 (4th ed.
1947).
3. Empire State Aluminum Corp. v. Empire Aluminum Co., 152 N.E.2d 7 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1957).
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